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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent trade models with heterogeneous firms (Bernard et al., 2003 and Melitz, 2003) show how 
lower trade costs can spur aggregate productivity by forcing lower productivity firms out of the 
market, cutting off the lower tail of the productivity distribution. In this paper we find significant 
heterogeneity regarding this impact across different industries. In particular, we find that the exit of 
inefficient plants due to stronger import competition is very prominent in light industries, that is, in 
industries in which only a limited amount of capital is needed and where most plants are of small-
scale. In contrast, we find no significant effects of import competition on the exit of plants in heavy 
industries. The result has important policy implications regarding the role of trade reform in 
boosting aggregate productivity, particularly in industries with high levels of distortions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A large body of empirical research at the micro level has shown the existence of positive links 
between international trade and productivity (see e.g. Aw, Chung, and Roberts, 2000; Bernard and 
Jensen., 1999; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Harrison, 1994; Pavcnik, 
2002: Alvarez and Lopez, 2005; and Fernandes, 2007). One of those links comes from effects of 
import competition. Recent trade models with heterogeneous firms (Bernard et al., 2003), for 
example, show how lower trade costs and the subsequent increase in import competition can spur 
aggregate productivity by forcing lower productivity firms out of the market, cutting off the lower 
tail of the productivity distribution and releasing resources to the most productive firms.  
 
Empirical evidence supporting this trade-induced reallocation channel has been found in 
Bernard et al., (2006) and Eslava et al., (2009). How do this trade-related reallocation effect play out 
in different industries, however, is relatively less known. This paper aims to fill this gap in the 
literature. Using plant-level data from Venezuela, we find significant heterogeneity regarding the 
impact of import competition on resource reallocation in different industries. In particular, we find 
that the exit of inefficient plants due to stronger import competition is very prominent in light 
industries, that is, in industries in which only a limited amount of capital is needed and where most 
plants are of small-scale. In contrast, we find no significant effects of import competition on the exit 
of plants in heavy industries.  
 
Plants in heavy industries are normally of large-scale and frequently big investments are 
required to set them up. It is possible that plants in these industries have bigger pockets and thus are 
better prepared to stand the increase competition from lower trade barriers. An alternative argument 
is that the presence of heavy industries is the direct result of some factor abundance in the country. 
For instance, large endowments of oil can lead to a vibrant downstream industry of petroleum sub-
products and derivatives. Such a comparative advantage may guarantee the survival of the plants 
even after trade protection is lowered. A final possibility is that governments might confer strategic 
importance to heavy industries –even if they do not have comparative advantages- and nurtures 
them with various instruments like tax breaks, preferential credit rates or by imposing barriers to 
entry. It is in this case that trade might lose its Darwinian effect of weeding out the low productivity 
firms failing to improve aggregate productivity. This case underlies the potential limited role of trade 
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in boosting aggregate productivity in certain industries. We present some evidence regarding the 
likelihood of these hypotheses and discuss their relevance for pursuing additional research. 
 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The next section explains the estimating 
methodology which takes in consideration key insights from the new trade models. This section also 
describes the datasets employed. The main results are presented section III while section IV finalizes 
with some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
An increasing body of evidence indicates that a large share of aggregate productivity growth arises 
from the reallocation of resources from low to high productivity plants (see e.g., Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999, and Bartelsman, et. al., 2004). Very influential new trade models with heterogeneous 
firms indeed suggest that international trade plays an important role in this reallocative process. For 
instance, declining trade costs force low productivity plants to exit the market in Bernard et al. 
(2003) and in Melitz (2003) leading to an increase in aggregate efficiency. The mechanisms by which 
the exit of the inefficient plants occurs, however, differs slightly between the two models. In Melitz 
(2003), for example, lower trade costs abroad attract new firms into the export market increasing the 
labor demand at home, the real wage and forcing the least productive firms to exit. In Bernard et al. 
(2003) the low productivity plants exit the market because of the direct increased import 
competition from abroad. In our empirical work we use trade costs for imports, therefore, our 
analysis is closer in spirit to Bernard et al. (2003). 
 
Based on this theoretical framework, we specifically ask whether plants in industries with 
larger reductions in tariff rates are more likely to exit the market. To this end we run the following 
probit model based on Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006): 
 
)()Pr( 11 rtjjitjtijt XTare αααγβφ ++++Δ= −+    (1) 
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where 1+jite  takes the value of 1 if plant i in industry j exits between periods t and t+1, 1−Δ jtTar  is the 
change in the tariff rate in industry j between t-1 and t; ijtX  is a vector of plant characteristics and 
jα , tα  and rα  are industry, time and region effects respectively. 
 
Equation (1) is the baseline model that will be applied to the entire sample of firms and to 
the sub-groups of industries. The strategy consists on comparing the estimated beta coefficients for 
these sub-groups of industries. 
 
II.2 Data 
 
We use a panel of manufacturing plants drawn from the Venezuelan Industrial Survey 
(Encuesta Industrial de Venezuela). This is an annual survey of manufacturing conducted by the 
Venezuelan Statistics Agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). The survey covers 
manufacturing plants that employ at least five individuals and collects detailed information on plant 
characteristics, such as geographic location, manufacturing industry, production, value added, 
exports, employment, intermediate inputs, and investment.  
 
Sales, and value added from this survey were deflated to 1995 prices with sectoral price 
indices obtained from the Venezuelan Central Bank. The capital stocks were constructed using the 
perpetual inventory method for various types of capital including structures, vehicles and machinery 
and equipment. Appropriate deflators from the Venezuelan Central Bank for the various capital 
equipments were used to deflate the different components. The initial capital stock is constructed as 
the value of capital stock reported in books (deflated) minus the reported depreciation that year. 
Subsequent years were calculated using the perpetual inventory method with depreciation rates equal 
to 5% for structures, 15% for machinery and equipment and 20% for vehicles (see Liu, 1993).  
 
A key issue in calculating total factor productivity with firm level data is the potential 
correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels. Profit-maximizing firms 
respond to positive productivity shocks by expanding output, which in turn requires more inputs. A 
widely used estimator that employs investment as a proxy for these unobservable shocks is given by 
Olley and Pakes (1996). Another estimator that uses intermediate inputs as proxies of these shocks 
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has been introduced more recently by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). These authors argue that 
intermediates may respond more smoothly to productivity shocks. We use the Levinsohn and Petrin 
methodology to construct our measures of total factor productivity.1 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the plant exit/survival process, we are interested in covering 
the longest time period possible. The available data spans from 1995 to 2004. The survey is 
conducted using a stratified random sample procedure with 828 strata corresponding to 4 
occupational categories, 23 estates and 9 economic activities (ISIC revision 2 at 2 digits). Only the 
largest occupation category -that is plants with more than 100 employees- is treated like a census 
during this entire period of analysis. This implies that only the plant exits that are recorded in this 
occupational category represent “true” exits of the market and not the result of the random 
sampling process. Accordingly, we use only the plants in this occupational category which provides 
us with a panel of 6,431 observations. Table 1 shows a summary statistics of the main variables used 
from this survey. 
 
The ad valorem tariff rates come from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). The information refers 
to applied tariff rates which take into consideration preference schemes. The data is provided at the 
3 digit ISIC revision 2 industry level, where the rate in industry j is the import weighted average 
across all products in j. Table 2 reports the information for three alternative years. The average tariff 
rate in Venezuela and its dispersion increased from 1995 to 2000, but declined since then. Between 
2000 and 2004, the external protection rate fell in 28 out of 29 industries. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
Before testing the prediction of the model stated above, we would like investigate whether 
firms that exit are in general less productive than firms that do not exit. This is shown in Table 3. 
The table reports the result from a regression of the following form:  
 
itrtjiitit XLTFP εαααγβα ++++++=)ln(     (2) 
                                                 
1 In particular, we use value added as the dependent variable and electricity consumption to proxy for unobserved 
productivity. We estimate separate production functions at a 2-digit ISIC level of disaggregation to guarantee that there 
is enough variation to estimate the coefficients. 
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where the dependent variable is the TFP of plant; itL  is the plant's labor force (a proxy for size); iX  
is a dummy equal to 1 if the plant exit during the sample period and jα , tα  and rα  are industry, 
year and region fixed effects. The coefficient in the table reports the estimated γˆ  for the regression.  
 
The result indicate that after controlling for differences in size, industry and region 
characteristics, plants that exit are indeed less productive than plants that do not exit. Plants that exit 
are on average 18% less productive than plants that do not exit. While not directly testing the effects 
of trade costs on resource allocation, this result provides a preliminary element that is important for 
the improvement of the reallocation of resources to take place, namely that the plants that normally 
exit are on average less productive than the plants that do not exit. We now investigate in more 
detail what is the likelihood that a plant would exit the market in the face of declining trade costs. 
 
Results of estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 4. The first column focuses only on 
the tariff rate. The second column includes the plant’s productivity. According to the theory, 
productivity should be negatively associated with plant exit. In column 3 we include additional plant 
controls that may be related to the probability of exit: the plant’s labor force (the proxy for size) and 
its capital intensity. Finally, in column (4) we also include the interaction between the productivity of 
the plant and the change in trade costs. This interaction term seeks to explore whether the 
probability of exit when trade costs fall is relatively lower for high-productivity plants.  
 
According to the results from all the columns, a reduction in trade costs increases the 
probability of plant exit. The coefficient for the change in the tariff rate is statistically significant at 
conventional levels in all the regressions. Productivity is also found to be negatively associated with 
plant exit. This is consistent with results in Tybout (1991), Liu (1993), Liu and Tybout (1996), and 
Pavcnik (2002) that find that the probability of exiting is smaller for the more efficient plants. Plants 
that have higher capital labor ratios also exhibit lower probabilities of exit while size does not seem 
to have a statistically significant impact. 
 
Regarding the interaction term, the coefficient does not seem to be statistically significant. 
However, the interaction effects in nonlinear models cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the 
sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of such coefficients (see Ai and Norton, 2003). The 
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marginal effects of interaction terms in nonlinear models require computing cross derivatives that 
standard econometric packages do not perform. In addition, such marginal effects could have 
different signs and different statistically significances for different observations. Therefore, in order 
to check whether the marginal effect of productivity increases with falling trade costs, we use the Ai 
and Norton’s algorithm for computing marginal effects of interaction terms in nonlinear models. 
The procedure calculates the interaction effect, standard error, and z-statistic for each observation. 
Results are shown in Figures 1a and 1b. The interaction term (Figure 1a) varies substantially with 
positive values for some observations and negative values for others. In terms of the significance, 
while the mean z-statistic for all the observations (-0.20) is not statistically significant, the interaction 
effects for a group of observations are indeed statistically significant (see Figure 1b). Note that the 
significant observations are positive in value which is consistent with the theory: the marginal 
propensity that a plant will exit the market driven by falling trade costs decreases with the level of 
productivity. 
 
Having shown that lower trade costs increase the probability of exit, particularly for the low 
productivity plants, we now like to examine whether these results hold across different industries. In 
particular, we separate the plants into two groups: plants that belong to light industries and those 
that belong to heavy industries. Light industries are normally characterized by having small-scale 
plants that need only a limited amount of capital to operate, tend to make small products mainly to 
be bought by individuals and are relatively footloose. Typical examples of these industries are 
clothing, shoes, food-processing, toys or electronics. Heavy industries, on the other hand, tend to 
make large products often bought by other manufacturing companies, plants are normally of large-
scale, often require large capital investments, and are relatively constrained in their locational choices 
given their typical intensive used of raw materials. Examples of these industries are steel, oil-refining, 
chemicals or transport equipment. 
 
More specifically we grouped as light industries the following activities: manufacturing of 
food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 31), textile and wearing apparel (ISIC 32), wood products and 
furniture (ISIC 33), paper and paper products (ISIC 34), and machinery and equipment (ISIC 38) 
except transport equipment (ISIC 384). On the other hand, heavy industries include: chemical, 
petroleum products and refineries (ISIC 35), non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 36), basic metal 
industries (ISIC 37) and transport equipment (ISIC 384). 
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Table 5 presents a comparison between these two industries in some key variables. It is clear 
that plants in heavy industries are on average larger and are more capital intensive that their 
counterparts in the light industries. For instance, plants in heavy industries have on average about 
100 more workers than their counterparts in the light industries and twice as much capital per 
worker. The third column in the table also shows that plants in heavy industries tend to exhibit a 
lower exit rate on average than the plants in light industries. We now investigate whether the response 
of the exit rate to lower trade costs also differ among the two groups. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for the sub-group of light industries. 
The results are very similar to those in Table 4 in the sense that a reduction in trade costs increases 
the probability of plant exit even after controlling for various plant characteristics. The productivity 
of the plant and its capital intensity are also negatively correlated with plant exit. Finally, while the 
interaction term does not seem to be statistically significant, the marginal effects computed with the 
Ai and Norton’s algorithm show that for a small group of observations they are positive and 
statistically significant (see Figures 2a and 2b) as predicted by the theory. Once again, this indicates 
that lower trade costs increase the probability of exit relatively more in plants of low productivity. 
 
In Table 7, we repeat the same exercises but now for the group of plants belonging to the 
heavy industries. The results are striking. There is no effects of trade costs on the exit of plants. 
While the estimated coefficients of trade costs are negative, they are not statistically different from 
zero in any of the regressions. The reductions in trade costs do not increase the likelihood of plant 
exit in any of the estimations. The interaction effect computed with the Ai and Norton’s procedure 
is shown in Figures 3a and 3b. The marginal effects of the interaction are not statistically significant 
for any of the observations. This implies that lower trade costs do not even increase the probability 
of exit for the low productivity plants. 
 
The results shown in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that there is a high degree of heterogeneity 
across light and heavy industries in terms of their response to reductions in trade barriers. We now 
present some arguments that may help explain these differences. One possibility is related to 
intrinsic distinctions in plant characteristics. For example, plants in heavy industries are normally of 
large-scale and frequently big capital investments are required to set them up. Table 5 indeed shows 
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that these plants are larger and have more capital investment per worker than the average plant in 
light industries. It is possible then that their scale and their capital intensity allow them to have easier 
access to financial resources –for instance, they have larger tangible capital to use as collateral- than 
the smaller plants in the light industries. Therefore, to the extent that these plants may have access 
to more resources, they may be better prepared to adjust and potentially restructure if they face 
stronger competition from abroad.   
 
A second possibility is that the presence of heavy industries is a direct consequence of some 
form of comparative advantage. For instance, large endowments of oil can lead to a vibrant 
downstream industry of petroleum sub-product and derivatives. These plants might be already world 
class competitors and thus reductions in their levels of protection might not disrupt in any 
significant way their production processes. The analysis in this paper uses data on Venezuelan plants 
where the lion’s share of the heavy industries lies on chemical, petroleum products and refineries 
(ISIC 35) and on basic metal industries (ISIC 37). In both cases, the raw materials used in these 
industries – oil in the first case and iron in the second - are found in abundance beneath Venezuelan 
soil. For instance, Venezuela is among the top 10 exporters of oil and among the top 15 producers 
of iron. Proximity to these natural resources may provide some comparative advantages to the 
downstream industries that use them intensively. Therefore, we cannot rule out that comparative 
advantage may play a role in the lack of response of the exit rate. 
 
A third possibility is that governments might confer strategic importance to heavy industries 
and nurtures them with various instruments like tax breaks, preferential credit rates or by imposing 
barriers to entry. This has certainly happened many times in history. For example, between 1973 and 
1980 Korea embarked on a heavy industrialization program that focused on building up sectors like 
steel, nonferrous metals and chemicals, among others. But the existence of preferential treatment to 
plants in heavy industries might lead to a misallocation of resources if governments fail to let them 
go when they become unproductive. It is in this case that trade might lose its Darwinian effect of 
weeding out the low productivity firms failing to improve aggregate productivity. This possibility 
underlies the potential limited role of trade in boosting aggregate productivity in industries with large 
levels of with distortions. In the particular case of this paper, we cannot rule out the role of state 
intervention in explaining part of the outcome. The Venezuelan government has traditionally owned 
companies in the petrochemical and basic metal industries, for example. But analyzing precisely the 
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extent to which state-ownership or other types of state intervention are related to the lack of trade 
response in heavy industries goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
High trade costs tend to distort an efficient allocation of resources by protecting inefficient 
producers and by limiting the expansion of the efficient ones. A decline in trade costs, then, should 
promote a more efficient factor reallocation by increasing the likelihood that the inefficient 
producers exit the market, releasing resources to the most efficient producers thereby increasing 
aggregate productivity. While empirical evidence supporting this trade-induced reallocation channel 
has been found in Bernard et al., (2006) and Eslava et al., (2009) no particular attention has been 
given in the literature on whether these effects differ across various classes of industries. In this 
paper we test this proposition by dividing plants into two very simple classes: light and heavy 
industries. We find that the exit of inefficient plants due to stronger import competition is very 
prominent in light industries but no effects were observed in heavy industries. 
 
The lack of response in heavy industries calls for a greater attention on dissecting the effects 
of trade by industry-type incorporating industry-idiosyncratic elements to the analysis. We have 
raised three distinct hypotheses that may help explain the lack of response of the exit rate to changes 
in trade costs in heavy industries. One of these hypotheses is the possibility that governments might 
confer strategic importance to heavy industries and nurtures them with various instruments like tax 
breaks, preferential credit rates or by imposing barriers to entry. It is in this case that trade might 
lose its Darwinian effect of weeding out the low productivity firms failing to improve aggregate 
productivity. This mere possibility generates important policy implications regarding the role of 
trade reform. That is, it is possible that trade might not boost aggregate productivity (as argued by 
new trade models) if industries are highly distorted by state intervention. Indeed, this possibility 
might not be exclusive to interventions in heavy industries, but to any part of the economy. How 
pervasive might be the effects of government interventions in limiting the reallocation effects of 
trade is clearly an area that deserves more empirical research. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Labor 5.37 0.82 
Capital / Labor 6.81 1.40 
Total Factor Productivity 6.26 1.19 
Exit Rate 0.05 0.02 
No of observations 6431   
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of the log of labor, the log of the 
capital-labor ratio, the log of TFP and the exit rate. The exit rate is the number of plants 
that reported positive production in period t but not in period t+1 divided by the total 
number of plants in period t.  
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Table 2: Ad valorem tariffs by three-digit ISIC industry 
Industry Tariffs (%)   
    1995 2000 2004   
311 Food manufacturing 14.3 18.8 13.9 
312 Prepared animal feeds & food products nec 14.1 18.6 13.7 
313 Beverages 17.0 18.7 18.6 
314 Tobacco 19.9 20.0 18.0 
321 Textiles 11.5 17.8 16.2 
322 Wearing, apparel 13.5 19.8 19.5 
323 Leather products 9.1 17.4 16.0 
324 Footwear 14.7 20.0 19.5 
331 Wood products 8.7 13.9 13.6 
332 Furniture 15.3 19.2 16.8 
341 Paper and products 7.8 9.9 7.9 
342 Printing and publishing 12.6 6.9 7.1 
351 Industrial chemicals 8.8 7.8 7.1 
352 Other chemicals 9.0 11.1 8.8 
353 Petroleum refineries 8.9 9.8 8.7 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 8.5 8.4 6.7 
355 Rubber products 11.5 13.5 13.1 
356 Plastic products 15.1 18.4 16.7 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 10.7 17.6 13.7 
362 Glass and products 12.4 14.3 12.4 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 12.7 13.9 12.5 
371 Iron and steel 10.9 11.9 9.5 
372 Non-ferrous metals 5.1 9.8 6.0 
381 Fabricated metal products 13.7 15.4 13.8 
382 Machinery, except electrical 10.9 9.2 8.7 
383 Machinery, electric 13.8 10.6 9.1 
384 Transport equipment 16.1 24.6 21.0 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 11.9 7.9 7.4 
390 Other manufactured products 17.0 17.9 14.7 
Average 12.2 14.6 12.8 
Standard deviation 3.3 4.8 4.5   
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Table 3: Average plant’s TFP relative to 
comparator 
  
Plants that exit / plants do not exit -0.180*** 
(0.0373) 
    
Notes: Plant-level regression results. Dependent variable is the plant's TFP. 
Regressors include the plant's size (Labor), year, industry and location fixed effects, 
and a dummy equal to 1 if the plant exit during the sample period. The coefficient in 
the table reports the result for this dummy variable 
 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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Table 4: Probability of exit. All industries 
Regressor Probit  Probit  Probit   Probit 
   (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
Change in tariff -0.0949*** -0.0872*** -0.0860*** -0.0930** 
(0.0328) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0323) 
Productivity -0.0107*** -0.0102*** -0.0098*** 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Labor -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
Capital / Labor -0.0044** -0.0045** 
(0.0018) (0.0018) 
Change in tariff  x  productivity -0.0297 
(0.0221) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4923 4846 4846 4846 
Pseudo R2  0.08  0.09  0.09   0.09 
Notes: Plant-level probit regression results. Numbers are marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC level in 
parentheses. Industry fixed effects are also at the three-digit ISIC level. Dependent variable indicates plant exit between years t and t+1. First regressor is the 
change in the tariff rate between t-1 and t. Next three regressors are plant controls for year t where productivity, labor and capital/labor are the plant's TFP, 
its total labor force and the capital labor ratio respectively. All plant controls are in logs. Last regressor is the interaction between the change in the tariff rate 
and the plant's TFP. 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 5: Light versus heavy industries.  
Averages of selected variables in levels 
Variable 
Light 
industries 
Heavy 
industries 
Labor 287 371 
Capital / Labor 1569 3105 
Exit Rate 0.0544 0.0393 
 Notes: The table reports the average of labor, capital-labor ratio, and the exit rate for all the 
plants in each industry category.   
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Table 6: Trade costs and probability of exit. Light industries 
Regressor Probit  Probit  Probit   Probit 
   (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
Change in tariff -0.1095** -0.1024** -0.1002** -0.1123** 
(0.0404) (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0429) 
Productivity -0.0123*** -0.0117*** -0.0115*** 
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Labor -0.0025 -0.0025 
(0.0050) (0.0050) 
Capital / Labor -0.0042* -0.0043* 
(0.0023) (0.0023) 
Change in tariff  x  productivity -0.0390 
(0.0321) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2910 2847 2847 2847 
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.10  0.10   0.10 
Notes: Plant-level probit regression results. Numbers are marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC level in 
parentheses. Industry fixed effects are also at the three-digit ISIC level. Dependent variable indicates plant exit between years t and t+1. First regressor is the 
change in the tariff rate between t-1 and t. Next three regressors are plant controls for year t where productivity, labor and capital/labor are the plant's TFP, 
its total labor force and the capital labor ratio respectively. All plant controls are in logs. Last regressor is the interaction between the change in the tariff rate 
and the plant's TFP. 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 7: Trade costs and probability of exit. Heavy industries 
Regressor Probit  Probit  Probit   Probit 
   (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
Change in tariff -0.0581 -0.0517 -0.0529 -0.0530 
(0.0464) (0.0438) (0.0430) (0.04237) 
Productivity -0.0074* -0.0073* -0.0071* 
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0042) 
Labor -0.0009 -0.0009 
(0.0029) (0.0029) 
Capital / Labor -0.0047 -0.0047 
(0.0029) (0.0030) 
Change in tariff  x  productivity -0.0074 
(0.0317) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1892 1878 1878 1878 
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.10  0.10   0.10 
Notes: Plant-level probit regression results. Numbers are marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC level in 
parentheses. Industry fixed effects are also at the three-digit ISIC level. Dependent variable indicates plant exit between years t and t+1. First regressor is the 
change in the tariff rate between t-1 and t. Next three regressors are plant controls for year t where productivity, labor and capital/labor are the plant's TFP, 
its total labor force and the capital labor ratio respectively. All plant controls are in logs. Last regressor is the interaction between the change in the tariff rate 
and the plant's TFP. 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Figure 1a: Interaction Effects 
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Figure 1b: z-statistics of interaction effects 
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Figure 2a: Interaction Effects 
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Figure 2b: z-statistics of interaction effects 
Light industries  
-5
0
5
10
z-
st
at
is
tic
0 .2 .4 .6
Predicted Probability that y = 1
 
 
 22
Figure 3a: Interaction Effects 
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Figure 3b: z-statistics of interaction effects 
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